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Abstract. We propose a method for the release of differentially private synthetic datasets. In many
contexts, data contain sensitive values which cannot be released in their original form in order to
protect individuals’ privacy. Synthetic data is a protection method that releases alternative values
in place of the original ones, and differential privacy (DP) is a formal guarantee for quantifying the
privacy loss. We propose a method that maximizes the distributional similarity of the synthetic data
relative to the original data using a measure known as the pMSE, while guaranteeing -differential pri-
vacy. Additionally, we relax common DP assumptions concerning the distribution and boundedness
of the original data. We prove theoretical results for the privacy guarantee and provide simulations
for the empirical failure rate of the theoretical results under typical computational limitations. We
also give simulations for the accuracy of linear regression coefficients generated from the synthetic
data compared with the accuracy of non-differentially private synthetic data and other differentially
private methods. Additionally, our theoretical results extend a prior result for the sensitivity of the
Gini Index to include continuous predictors.
Keywords: differential privacy, synthetic data, classification trees
1 Introduction
In many contexts, researchers wish to gain access to data which are restricted due to privacy concerns.
While there are many proposed methods for allowing researchers to fit models or receive query responses
from the data, there are other cases where either due to methodological familiarity or modeling flexibility,
researchers desire to have an entire dataset rather than a set of specific queries. This paper proposes
a method for releasing synthetic datasets under the framework of -differential privacy, which formally
quantifies and guarantees the privacy loss from these releases.
Differential privacy(DP), originally proposed by Dwork et al. (2006), is a formal method of quantifying
the privacy loss related to any release of information based on private data; for a more in-depth review see
Dwork et al. (2014), and for a non-technical primer see Nissim et al. (2017). Since its inception, DP has
spawned a large literature in computer science and some in statistics. It has been explored in numerous
contexts such as machine learning algorithms (e.g., Blum et al. (2005); Kasiviswanathan et al. (2011);
Kifer et al. (2012)), categorical data (e.g., Barak et al. (2007); Li et al. (2010)), dimension reduction (e.g.,
Chaudhuri et al. (2012); Kapralov and Talwar (2013)), performing statistical analysis (e.g., Wasserman
and Zhou (2010); Karwa et al. (2016)), and streaming data (e.g., Dwork et al. (2010)), to name only a
few applications.
While DP is a rigorous risk measure, it has lacked flexible methods for modeling and generating
synthetic data. Non-differentially private synthetic data methods (e.g., see Raghunathan et al. (2003);
Reiter (2005, 2002); Drechsler (2011); Raab et al. (2017)) while not offering provable privacy, provide good
tools for approximating accurate generative models reflecting the original data. Our proposed method
maintains the flexible modeling approach of synthetic data methodology, and in addition maximizes a
metric of distributional similarity, the pMSE, between the released synthetic data and the original data,
subject to satisfying -DP. We also do not require one of the most common DP assumptions concerning
the input data, namely that it is bounded, and we do not limit ourselves to only categorical or discrete
data. We find that our method produces good results in simulations, and it provides a new avenue for
releasing DP datasets for potentially a wide-range of applications.
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Our specific contributions are: (1) the combination of the flexible synthetic data modeling framework
with the guarantee of -DP, (2) the relaxation of DP assumptions concerning boundedness or discreteness of
the input data, (3) the embedding of a metric within our mechanism guaranteeing maximal distributional
similarity between the synthetic and original data, and (4) a proof for the sensitivity bound of the Gini
Index for CART models in the presence of continuous predictors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a review of important results from
differential privacy that we rely on and provides a review of related methods to ours which we use for
comparison in our simulation study. Section 3 details our proposed methodology for sampling differentially
private data with maximal distributional similarity. Section 4 provides theoretical results for the privacy
guarantees of our algorithm. Section 5 shows simulations that support our theoretical findings and provide
an empirical estimate of the privacy loss under standard computational practices. Section 6 provides
simulation results for the comparison of the accuracy of linear regression coefficients calculated from our
method and other DP methods. Section 7 details conclusions and future considerations.
2 Differential Privacy Preliminaries
Differentially Privacy is a formal framework for quantifying the disclosure risk associated with the release of
statistics or raw data derived from private input data. The general concept relies on defining a randomized
algorithm which has similar output probabilities regardless of the presence or absence of any given record,
as formalized in Definition 1. We replicate the definitions and theorems here using notation assuming
X ∈ Rn×q and θ ∈ Rk. X is an original data matrix, and we wish to release instead a private version, Xs,
with the same dimension. θ is a vector of parameters corresponding to a chosen parameteric model, which
can be used to generate synthetic data that reflects the generative distribution of X. Further restrictions
may be placed on θ depending on the parametric model.
Definition 1 (Dwork et al. (2006)). A randomized algorithm, M, is -Differentially Private if for all
S ⊆ Range(M) and for all X,X ′ such that δ(X,X ′) = 1:
P (M(X ′) ∈ S)
P (M(X) ∈ S) ≤ exp().
The privacy is controlled by the  parameter, with values closer to zero offering stronger privacy. Relax-
ations of -DP have been proposed to reframe the privacy definition or to improve the statistical utility.
A few examples are approximate differential privacy (also known as (, δ)-DP, see Dwork et al. (2006)),
probabilistic differential privacy (Machanavajjhala et al. (2008)), on-average K-L privacy (Wang et al.
(2016)), or concentrated privacy (Dwork and Rothblum (2016); Bun and Steinke (2016)). We do not cover
these relaxtions further, since our work relies on the stronger -DP.
A general example of an -DP mechanism, which produces private outputs, is the Exponential Mech-
anism defined by McSherry and Talwar (2007); see Definition 2. For a given θ that we wish to release,
this mechanism defines a distribution from which private samples, θ˜i, can be made and released in place
of the original vector.
Definition 2 (McSherry and Talwar (2007)). The mechanism that releases values with probability
proportional to
exp
(
− u(X, θ)
2 ∆u
)
,
where u(X, θ) is a quality function that assigns values to each possible output, θ, satisfies -DP.
∆u is the global sensitivity, and it is defined as the greatest possible change in the u function for any two
inputs, differing in one row. Note that some definitions of DP use the addition or deletion of a row, but
here we assume X and X ′ have the same dimension. More formally:
Definition 3 (Dwork et al. (2006)). For all X,X ′ such that δ(X,X ′) = 1, the Global Sensitivity (GS)
of a function u : Rn×q → R≥0 is defined as:
∆u = sup
θ
sup
δ(X,X′)=1
|u(X, θ)− u(X ′, θ)|
We also rely on two theorems, known as post-processing and sequential composition. The first, stated in
Proposition 1, says that any function applied to the output from a differentially private algorithm is also
differentially private. We use this to generate synthetic data based on private parameters, rather than
directly generating differentially private data.
Proposition 1 (Dwork et al. (2006); Nissim et al. (2007)). Let M be any randomized algorithm,
such that M(X) satisfies -differential privacy, and let g be any function. g(M(X)) also satisfies -
differential privacy.
Sequential composition, stated in Theorem 1, says that for multiple outputs from a differentially private
algorithm, one must compose the  values for each output to produce the overall privacy loss of the
process. We need to compose the privacy if we make multiple draws of private parameters from which
we produce multiple private synthetic datasets. We may want to release multiple synthetic datasets for
better accuracy in estimates based on the data. Estimates based on multiple datasets are calculated using
appropriate combining rules; see Raab et al. (2017) for details.
Theorem 1 (McSherry (2009)). Suppose a randomized algorithm,Mj, satisfies j-differential privacy
for j = 1, ..., q. The sequence Mj(X) carried out on the same X provides (Σj j)-differential privacy.
These theorems and definitions lay the groundwork for our method. Next, we give a brief overview of
some related methods to ours which we use for comparison in our simulations in Section 6.
2.1 Review of Related Methods
A number of different methods have been proposed for releasing differentially private synthetic datasets,
although only a few are focused on real-valued, n× q matrices. Bowen and Liu (2016) proposed drawing
data from a noisy Bayesian Posterior Predictive Distribution (BPPD), and Wasserman and Zhou (2010)
generate data from smooth histograms. Bowen and Liu (2016) provides a fairly comprehensive list of DP
synthetic data methods. Many of these methods are limited to specific data types, such as categorical data
(e.g., Abowd and Vilhuber (2008); Charest (2011)), or network data (e.g., Karwa et al. (2016, 2017)), or
they are computational infeasibile for data with a reasonable number of dimensions, such as the Empirical
CDF (Wasserman and Zhou (2010)), NoiseFirst/StructureFirst (Xu et al. (2013)), or the PrivBayes (Zhang
et al. (2017)), though some recent work has proposed ways to reduce the computation time and improve
the accuracy (Li et al. (2018)).
The noisy BPPD method from Bowen and Liu (2016) is similar to ours in the sense that focuses on
drawing generative model parameters from a noisy distribution and then using these private parameters
generates private synthetic data according to post-processing. In this case private parameters are drawn
from posterior distribution f(θ|s∗) where s is the Bayesian sufficient statistic and s∗ is the statistic
perturbed according to the Laplace mechanism (e.g., see Dwork et al. (2006)). Bowen and Liu (2016)
recommend drawing multiple sets of private parameters and producing a synthetic dataset for each one,
which requires composing .
The smooth histogram method from Wasserman and Zhou (2010) works non-parametrically by binning
the data, using these bins to estimate a consistent density function, and applying smoothing to the function
which guarantees DP before drawing new samples. The DP smooth histrogram is defined as:
fˆ∗K(x) = (1− λ)fˆK(x) + λΩ (1)
where K is the total number of bins, Ω =
(∏p
j=1(cj1 − cj0)
)−1
, λ ≥ K
K+n(e/n−1) , and fˆK(x) is a
mean-squared consistent density histogram estimator. This method does not need to generate multiple
datasets, since it is not redrawing model parameters, and accordingly does not need to split  across
multiple synthetic datasets.
However, both of these methods require bounded data. This can be seen explicitly in the smooth
histogram formulation where we assume the jth variable has bounds [cj0, cj1]. We also need to assume
bounds in order to create (and sample from) a finite K bins. The boundedness assumption is less explicit
in the noisy BPPD method, but it comes into play when calculating the sensitivity of the statistics. If the
data were unbounded, the sensitivity could be infinite, which would mean we have to sample the noise
from a Laplace distribution with infinite variance.
We want to avoid this assumption in our method because assuming bounds is problematic when
it comes to approximating the underlying generative distribution. Continuous data may be naturally
unbounded, and at best in many real data scenarios we do not know what the bounds should be. If our
bounds are too loose, we introduce more noise than necessary through the privacy process, limiting our
accuracy. On the other hand, we introduce bias if we set the bounds too low because that truncates the
generative distribution below its true range. We further explore the effect of these assumed bounds using
a simulation study in Section 6.
Our method avoids the bounding problem by sampling from a distribution that shrinks in probability
as we move to the tails. We do not bound the sample space, but we have low probability of sampling
values which are far from the truth. This allows us to produce private data that accurately reflects the
natural range of the data. We describe this further in Section 3.1.
Furthermore, the smooth histogram method suffers from computational limitations as the number
of variables increases, since it divides the data matrix into bins, the number of which grows O(pp). Our
method has computational limitations too, though of a different nature, which we discuss further in Section
3. One nice aspect of the noisy BPPD method is that it is computationally fast.
Finally, our method improves over these methods by incorporating a measure of distributional simi-
larity on the resulting synthetic data. The noisy BPPD and smooth histogram add noise to the generative
model for the synthetic data. These mechanisms concern only minimizing the noise added to the param-
eters, but they guarantee nothing concerning the data generated using these parameters. Our method
on the other hand, finds the private parameters which can be used to generate synthetic data that will
maximize the distributional similarity with respect to the original data. Regardless of the dataset, our
method finds the best private parameters for an assumed synthesizing model. Sections 3 and 4 give a
detailed explaination and theoretical results for our method.
3 Sampling Differentially Private Synthetic Data via the pMSE Mechanism
We propose to release a DP synthetic data matrix, Xs, in place of the original data X and with the
same dimension, n × q. In practice it is infeasible to sample a matrix of this size using the Exponential
Mechanism. More simply, we sample private model parameters and then generate synthetic data based
on these noisy parameters. We know from the results on post-processing, see Proposition 1, that data
generated based on these DP parameters are also DP. Based on the exponential mechanism we draw DP
samples using
f(θ) ∝ exp
(
− u(X, θ)
2∆u
)
, (2)
where  is our privacy parameter, u(X, θ) is our quality (or utility) function, and ∆u is the sensitivity
of the quality function. In practice we use a Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) approach, using the
Metropolis algorithm to generate samples from this unnormalized density, since we do not know the value
of the u function a priori. Next we define our quality function and derive a bound on its sensitivity.
3.1 Defining the Quality Function using the pMSE
We base our quality function on the pMSE statistic developed in Woo et al. (2009) and Snoke et al.
(2018):
pMSE =
1
N
ΣNi=1(pˆi − 0.5)2,
where pˆi are predicted probabilities (i.e., propensity scores) from a chosen classification algorithm. Algo-
rithm 1 gives the steps for calculating the pMSE statistic. The pMSE is simply the mean-squared error of
the predicted probabilities from this classification task, and it is a metric to assess how well we are able
to discern between datasets based on a classifier. If we are unable to discern, the two datasets have high
distributional similarity. A pMSE = 0 means every pˆi = 0.5, and it implies the highest utility. There has
been much work dedicated to tuning models for out-of-sample prediction, but for our purposes we only
use the classifier to get estimates of the in-sample predicted probabilities.
Algorithm 1 General Method for Calculating the pMSE
1: stack the n rows of original data X and the n rows of masked data Xs to create Xcomb with N = 2n
rows
2: add an indicator variable, I, to Xcomb s.t. I = {1 : xcombi ∈ Xs}
3: fit a model to predict I using predictors Z = f(Xcomb).
4: find predicted probabilities of class 1, pˆi, for each row of X
comb
5: obtain the pMSE = 1NΣ
N
i=1(pˆi − 0.5)2
To make our quality function a function of θ, the vector of parameters we wish to sample, we use the
expected value of the pMSE given θ, i.e.,
u(X, θ) = E[pMSE(X,Xsθ )|X, θ] (3)
where Xs ∼ g(θ). In practice we approximate this by generating m datasets for a given set of parameters
and calculate the average pMSE across each data set. This approximation does not affect the privacy
guarantee (as shown in the proof for Theorem 2), but for accuracy m should be large enough to give
satisfactory results for estimating the expected value of u(X, θ).
As we mentioned before, this quality function makes no assumptions concerning whether the original
data are categorical, discrete, or continuous. Secondly, because the pMSE is a function of the predicted
probabilities, pˆ, which are bounded ∈ [0, 1], the pMSE is bounded ∈ [0, 0.25]. This is true regardless of
the range of the data, X, so we do not need to assume any kinds of bounds on the data.
We refer to our method as the pMSE Mechanism, since we rely on the pMSE for our quality function in
the exponential mechanism. Algorithm 2 outlines the steps of the pMSE mechanism. The main assumption
we need is that a reasonable generative model for the data, g(θ), exists.
Algorithm 2 Sampling DP Synthetic Data via the pMSE Mechanism
Input: Original dataset: X, chosen value: , synthesis model: g(θ), quality function: u(X, θ)
1: Sample l vectors {θ˜1, ..., θ˜l} from a density proportional to equation 2
2: For each θ˜i generate synthetic data set X
s
i ∼ g(θ˜i), giving m total synthetic datasets {Xs1 , ..., Xsl }
each with the same dimension as X
3: Releasing {Xs1 , ..., Xsl } satisfies (l)-DP
3.2 Estimating the pMSE using Classification and Regression Tree (CART) Models
A key component to defining our quality function is the classification model used to estimate the predicted
probabilities, pˆ, used in computing the pMSE. We choose the classification trees (Breiman et al. (1984)) fit
using the Gini Index, for two primary reasons. First, we need a tight bound on the sensitivity of u(X, θ).
While other machine learning models have been shown to outperform CART in many applications, we
would have a far weaker bound on the sensitivity and would need to add much more noise. Secondly, as
was shown in Snoke et al. (2018), CART models exhibit at least satisfactory performance in determining
the distributional similarity. Future work may prove desirable bounds on the sensitivity of the pMSE when
using stronger classifiers, in which case those models should certainly be adopted.
We use the impurity function known as Gini Index from Breiman et al. (1984), defined as:
GI = argmin ΣD+1i=1 ai
(
1− ai
mi
)
, (4)
where mi are the total number of observations in each node, ai are the number of observations labeled
1 in each node, and D is the total number of nodes. In practice these models are fit in a greedy manner
for computational purposes. The process is to make the first optimal split that minimizes the impurity
for two nodes, and then to make proceeding splits and adding additional nodes if doing so continues to
minimize the impurity according to a chosen cost function. If computation is not a concern, it would also
be possible for any fixed D to do a full grid search to determine the optimal D splits that minimize the
impurity over D+ 1 nodes. The difference between globally optimal and greedy trees is important for our
theoretical results. In our theoretical results in section 4 we prove the sensitivity bound when trees are
fit based on the globally optimal Gini Index, and in our simulations in section 5 we perform an emperical
examination of how frequently the greedy fitting violates our theoretical results.
4 Theoretical Results for the Sensitivity Bound
In order to sample from the exponential mechanism, we need to give a bound on the sensitivity of the
quality function. The pMSE function is naturally bounded, but in Theorem 2 we prove a much tighter
bound.
Theorem 2. Given u(X, θ) = Eθ[pMSE(X,X
s
θ )|X, θ] where pMSE = Σ2ni=1 (pˆi−0.5)
2
2n with pˆi estimated
from a classification tree with optimal splits found using the Gini Index. Then
∆u = sup
θ
sup
δ(X,X′)=1
|u(X, θ)− u(X ′, θ)| ≤ 1
n
,
where X,Xsθ ∈ Rn×q.
The proof is given in the Appendix. Intuitively, the proof follows from the fact that we can relate the
pMSE to the Gini Index. We can then bound the change in Gini Index given a change in one row of the
input data due to the fact that we are finding the global optimum. We will not suddenly do much better
or much worse. In fact, we can quantify exactly how much better or worse we can do, which leads to the
bound.
This bound is nice because it decreases with n, meaning the noise added decreases as the number
of observations increase. This bound matches the results derived for the sensitivity of the Gini Index
when assuming discrete predictors from Friedman and Schuster (2010). Our proof shows this the bound
remains the same when using continuous predictors. The result in Friedman and Schuster (2010) was used
for performing classification under differential privacy, rather than producing synthetic data, and we see
our extension of the proof to include continuous predictors as a useful side result of this paper.
It is important to note that this proof is for the theoretical case when we can find the optimal
partitioning for any number of nodes. The greedy method can violate the bound because we can no longer
control how much the Gini Index can change after changing one row. While it would be possible to use
our method with a full grid search, computationally this is a poor idea. On the other hand, it is necessary
in order to satisfy -DP. An alternative method could be to use adaptive composition, i.e., fit the CART
models greedily but in a way that satisfies DP. We could then compose the privacy between fitting the
CART model and sampling from the exponential distribution, which we explore in future work.
5 Empirical Failure Rate of the Sensitivity Bound
These simulations show the empirical rate for which the greedy fitting violates the bound. We can also
view the maximum simulated value as an empirical estimate of the sensitivity for this particular dataset,
but we are more interested in the failure rate. We generated datasets, X, with q = 2 and n = 5000.
X1 ∼ N(2, 10) and X2 ∼ N(−2.5 + 0.5x1, 3), and we produced X ′ by taking X and adding random
Gaussian noise, N(0, 25), to each variable for one observation. We then drew a synthetic dataset Xs
with Xs1 ∼ N(θ1, θ2) and Xs2 ∼ N(θ3 + θ4xs1, θ5) where θi ∼ N(0, 10). We estimated the pMSE with
respect to Xs for both X and X ′ and calculated the difference. Recall the theoretical sensitivity bound
is 1/n = 0.0002, and any values larger than this violate the bound. We repeated this process 1,000,000
times each using CARTs of depths 1, 2, 5, and unlimited for the pMSE model. For all trees we included
a complexity parameter (cp) requiring a certain percentage improvement in order to make an additional
split. This parameter is necessary in order to not produce trees that are fully saturated (one terminal
node per observation) when there is no depth limitation.
Table 1: Empirical failure rates of 1,000,000 simulations for the sensitivity bound when using the greedy
CART fitting algorithm for different tree sizes and different complexity parameters.
Tree Depth cp Percentage Violating Bound
Depth 1 0.01 0.0%
Depth 2 0.01 0.3%
Depth 5 0.01 0.6%
Depth Unlimited 0.01 0.7%
Depth 1 0.001 0.0%
Depth 2 0.001 0.5%
Depth 5 0.001 2.0%
Depth Unlimited 0.001 2.5%
Figure 1 shows a sample of the simulated empirical sensitivity results. There are four groupings, for
the trees with different depths, and darker points denote those violating the theoretical bound due to the
greedy fitting algorithm. Table 1 gives the full results. The percentage of simulations which violate the
bound increases with tree depth size, and in the unlimited case for cp = 0.01 the empirical failure rate
is ≤ 1%. As expected, there are no results which violate the bound when only one split is made. This
confirms our theoretical results because with only one split, greedy is equivalent to optimal, so the bound
is never violated in simulation. The empirical sensitivity also depends on the cp, so we ran simulations
for two different values. A lower cp will lead to larger trees (subject to depth constraints), which means
we are making more greedy splits and increasing the chance of violating the bound.
6 Empirical Evaluation of Differentially Private Linear Regression
In order to assess the practical statistical utility of our method, we ran simulations testing the accuracy
of an estimated linear regression model. Our method guarantees maximal distributional similarity of
the synthetic data based on the pMSE metric, but many researchers may be interested in more specific
comparisons such as regression outputs.
We simulate datasets, X, in the same way as in Sections 5 and 7. Using this data, we regress X2 on
X1 and get ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the intercept (βˆ0) and slope (βˆ1) coefficients. We
calculate the absolute difference between these estimates and the corresponding estimates we get by fitting
the same model with the differentially private methods, i.e., |βˆ− βˆpriv|. Our comparison methods are the
noisy Bayesian method from Bowen and Liu (2016) and the smooth histogram from Wasserman and Zhou
(2010), both described in Section 2.1. We also compare with methods that do not produce synthetic data
but produce DP regression estimates. Specifically, we use the Functional Mechanism of Zhang et al. (2012)
and Awan and Slavkovic (2018), considering l1 and l∞ mechanisms, respectively. Note that these methods
require the data to be bounded in the same way as the noisy Bayes and smooth histogram methods.
Finally we compare with estimates from non-DP synthetic data, sampled from the unperturbed BPDD.
For the pMSE mechanism, we carry out the simulations using trees of depths 1, 2, 5, and unlimited
with a cp = 0.01. We see that the utility significantly improves as we move from depth 1 to 2 and from
Fig. 1: Random sample of 10,000 simulations for each tree depth. Values shown are differences between
u(X, θ) calculated with X and X ′. Darker points violate the theoretical bound. Cp = 1%.
2 to 5, but there is little change from 5 to unlimited. This is likely because trees of depth 5 are large
enough to evaluate this dataset. The tree size is a potential tuning parameter for future work using this
method. Astute readers may have noticed that the unnormalized distribution we propose for the pMSE
mechanism does not neccesarily exist, since the probability in the tails remains very flat. To fix this, we
add a very flat prior, N(0, 100, 000), to each of our parameters when sampling. The flatness ensures it
does not affect the utility, but by adding it we also ensure the probability in the tails eventually goes to
zero.
We run the mechanisms with values  ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 1}. For the pMSE mechanism and the noisy BPDD
we generate l = 10 private datasets each satisfying (/l)-DP, and for the smooth histogram and functional
mechanisms we produce only one output satisfying -DP. This ensures all mechanisms satisfy the same
level of privacy. The non-DP synthetic data method does not guarantee any privacy.
For the noisy Bayes, smooth histogram, and functional mechanism methods, we ran the simulations
truncating the data at different assumed bounds. For both variables, we set these bounds at two, four, five,
or ten times the standard deviation. Four or five can be thought of as roughly the appropriate bounds,
since this is Gaussian data and most observations will fall into those ranges. Two was chosen to be a range
that is too narrow and excludes part of the true distribution, and ten was chosen for a looser bound. We
see from the results that the smaller bound achieves better results on the regression, even when it is more
narrow even than the truth. This is an artefact of the model we chose, and if an even tighter bound was
chosen it may have greater adverse effects. The loose bound (10 times) performs quite poorly, since we
must add much more noise. Figure 2 visualizes the better performing results (limited only for readability).
Full results for all tree sizes and bounds are shown in Figure 4 in the Appendix.
Overall our method outperforms the other two synthesis methods when using trees of depth 5 or
unlimited, regardless of the bounds chosen. Even trees of depth 2 perform roughly the same or better
than the other methods. For deeper trees, our method performs almost as well as the functional mechanism.
Fig. 2: Lineplots showing the mean simulation results. X-axis indicates different values of . Lines are also
subdivided within methods by the tree depth and the bound.
This is quite encouraging, since that method focuses only on providing regression estimates rather than
entire synthetic datasets. For a slight decrease in utility from the functional mechanism, our method
provides an entire synthetic dataset, which can be used to fit any number of models using our synthetic
data without changing the privacy guarantee. For the functional mechanism, it requires further splitting
of the privacy parameter to estimate a different model.
These results show good performance, and further work should consider simulations with larger num-
bers of variables or a mixture of categorical and continuous variables. We expect our method will only
improve against the other methods with more variables, since theoretically our method maximizes simi-
larity on the entire distribution.
7 Empirical Evaluation of the pMSE
We guarantee theoretical maximization of the pMSE for the differentially private synthetic data produced
from the pMSE mechanism, but as many practitioners know empirical tests often look slightly different
from theory. To evaluate this, we ran simulations to estimate the pMSE from datasets generated using
our method, two other DP synthesis methods, and a standard non-DP synthesis method.
Fig. 3: Simulations results showing the mean pMSE calculated using synthetic producing according to
four different methods. pMSE is calculated from comparison with original data, with values closer to 0
implying higher utility.
We again simulate datasets, X, in the same way as in Sections 5 and 6. For each X we generated
synthetic datasets Xs and then calculated the pMSE using X and Xs. Our four synthesis methods were
the pMSE mechanism, the noisy Bayesian method from Bowen and Liu (2016), the smooth histogram
from Wasserman and Zhou (2010), and sampling from the non-differentially private BPPD using fully con-
ditional sequential models. We ran 2,500 simulations each for five different values of  ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 4}.
For our method we used CART trees with unlimited depth, and for the other two DP methods we assumed
a bound on the data of four times the standard deviation, which is roughly the correct bound given that
it is Gaussian data. Figure 3 shows the results for the mean simualtions results and Table 2 shows the full
mean and variance of the results.
We see that as expected, the pMSE mechanism offers either the best or one of the best values of the
pMSE among the methods guaranteeing differential privacy. Interestingly the smooth histogram method
is fairly good as well, even offering comparable values at  = 0.25 or  = 4. The noisy BPPD method on
the other hand is quite bad, even at high levels of , so should be used with caution.
We also see that the variance in the estimated pMSE values changes quite a bit depending on the
method and level of . Both the pMSE mechanism and the smooth histogram show higher variances for
either low (0.25) or high (4) values of , while the noisy BPPD method increases in variance as  increases.
This variance is something to keep in mind both in choosing a protection method and in developing the
practical implementation. We could likely improve our current implementation of the pMSE mechanism
in order to better sample noisy parameters and generate synthetic data with less variance in the resulting
pMSE. On the other hand, it should also be expected that the variance decreases some as  grows because
we are adding less noise through the privacy mechanism.
Comparing the DP methods to the traditional synthetic data approach, we see that the best method
at  = 4 produces an average pMSE roughly two times that from the non-DP synthesis method, which is
Table 2: Simulation results giving the mean and variance of the pMSE values calculated using four
different synthesis methods and five different levels of .
 Simulated Values Non-DP pMSE Mech. DP Bayes Smooth Hist.
0.25 pMSE Mean 0.00660 0.09281 0.20509 0.08206
pMSE Var. 8.681e-07 1.347e-03 3.079e-03 2.826e-05
0.5 pMSE Mean 0.00663 0.03610 0.17876 0.05398
pMSE Var. 8.929e-07 8.020e-05 5.914e-03 1.809e-05
1 pMSE Mean 0.00661 0.02107 0.14372 0.03278
pMSE Var. 8.342e-07 1.648e-05 8.579e-03 1.069e-05
2 pMSE Mean 0.00660 0.01459 0.11177 0.01892
pMSE Var. 8.342e-07 1.648e-05 8.579e-03 1.069e-05
4 pMSE Mean 0.00660 0.01161 0.07919 0.01129
pMSE Var. 8.671e-07 3.329e-06 9.087e-03 5.964e-06
producing synthetic data from the correct generative model. This is actually quite good considering we
are adding the strong guarantee of DP. Even for  = 1 our method produces pMSE values only roughly
three times that of the non-DP synthetic data.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
The pMSE mechanism we propose provides a novel flexible method to produce high-quality synthetic
datasets guaranteeing -DP. By sampling generative model parameters from the exponential mechanism
and using the pMSE as our quality function, we produce synthetic data with maximal distributional
similarity to the original data. By using the pMSE, we ensure the sensitivity depends neither on the
dimension nor the range of the data, and the bound decreases as we increase the sample size. This allows
us to use this mechanism for continuous data, and the amount of noise we add will not grow with the
dimension (apart from sampling from a more complex distribution).
Our simulations in Sections 6 and 7 confirm that the pMSE mechanism generally performs as well
or better than the other standard DP synthesis methods. In the case of linear regression the pMSE
mechanism even performs roughly as well as methods that produce estimates of regression coefficients
only rather than entire synthetic datasets. In the case of the empirical pMSE, as expected our method
performs worse than non-DP synthetic data, but the utility cost seems reasonable for the privacy gain.
The pMSE mechanism relies on defining an appropriate form for the generative distribution from
which to draw synthetic values. It is possible to misspecific this model, which would lead to poor utility.
This is one drawback of the synthetic approach as opposed to simply adding noise. Fortnately, this aspect
has been addressed in great detail in the synthetic data literature, so we feel that finding an appropriate
model is possible without too much difficulty.
Our primary limitation is the computational feasibility to ensure the theoretical sensitivity bound.
From the empirical simulations we saw that the bound does not always hold when using typical greedy
fitting algorithms. Fitting the models using the global optimum would ensure the theoretical bound and
guarantee -DP. Proposals have been made to carry out machine learning using global optimums, such as
Bertsimas and Dunn (2017), so methods may exist to aid the computation.
An alternative implementation of our method would be to consider fitting the CART models in a way
that satisfies -DP and then composing this  with that from sampling from the pMSE mechanism. This
is similar to the approach of Li et al. (2018). This is desirable because we could use any standard CART
software to implement the method. Other future work could consider using different impurity measures
than the Gini Index, deriving measures of choosing the best tree size, or best practices for sampling from
the unnormalized density we get through the exponential mechanism.
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9 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. We first show that using the expected value, and approximating it, can be bounded above by the
supremum across all possible datasets Xs generated using θ.
∆u = sup
θ
sup
δ(X,X′)=1
|u(X, θ)− u(X ′, θ)| (5)
can be rewritten as
∆u = sup
θ
sup
δ(X,X′)=1
|Eθ[pMSE(X,Xsθ )|X, θ]− Eθ[pMSE(X ′, Xsθ )|X, θ]| (6)
where u(X, θ) = Eθ[pMSE(X,X
s
θ )|X, θ]. Since the absolute value is a convex function, we can apply
Jensen’s inequality and get
≤ sup
θ
sup
δ(X,X′)=1
Eθ[|pMSE(X,Xsθ )− pMSE(X ′, Xsθ )||X, θ]. (7)
Then by taking the supremum over any data set Xsθ , we obtain
≤ sup
Xsθ
sup
δ(X,X′)=1
|pMSE(X,Xsθ )− pMSE(X ′, Xsθ )|. (8)
This also bounds our approximation of the expected value that we propose to use in practice, since the
supremum is also greater than or equal to the sample mean.
Now writing this explicitly in terms of the CART model, we get
sup
ai, mi, a′i, m
′
i
1
2n
∣∣∣∣∣ΣD+1i=1 mi( aimi − 0.5
)2
−m′i
( a′i
m′i
− 0.5
)2∣∣∣∣∣ (9)
where ai, mi, and D are defined as before, and a
′
i and m
′
i are the corresponding values for the model fit
using X ′. Expanding this we get
sup
ai, mi, a′i, m
′
i
1
2n
∣∣∣∣∣ΣD+1i=1 ( a2imi − ai − 0.25mi
)
−
(a′2i
m′i
− a′i − 0.25m′i
)∣∣∣∣∣ (10)
and we can cancel the third terms because ΣD+1i=1 mi = Σ
D+1
i=1 m
′
i. When we multiple by 2n, the remaining
inside term is equivalent to the sensitivity of the impurity, i.e.,
sup
ai, mi, a′i, m
′
i
∣∣∣∣∣GI(X,Xs, D)−GI(X ′, Xs, D)
∣∣∣∣∣ = ∆GI (11)
By bounding the impurity, we bound the pMSE. We can rewrite the above as∣∣∣∣∣minD GI(X,Xs, D)−minD GI(X ′, Xs, D)
∣∣∣∣∣ (12)
since the optimal CART model finds the minimum impurity across any D. The greatest possible difference
then is the difference between these two optimums. And we can bound this above by
≤ sup
D
∣∣∣∣∣GI(X,Xs, D)−GI(X ′, Xs, D)
∣∣∣∣∣. (13)
Let Xcomb and X ′comb be the combined data matrices as described in Algorithm 1, including the 0, 1
outcome variable. Recall that only one record has changed between Xcomb and X ′comb (total number of
records staying fixed), and it is labeled 0. We know that for a given D optimal split points producing
D + 1 nodes on Xcomb, there are ai records labeled 1 and m˜i total records in each bin, such that ∃ j 6=
k 6= l1 6= ... 6= lD−1 s.t. m˜j −mj = mk − m˜k = 1, m˜lv = mlv for v = {1, ..., D − 1}. In the same way, for
a given D optimal split points producing D + 1 nodes on X ′comb, there are a′i records labeled 1 and m˜
′
i
total records in each bin, such that ∃ j′ 6= k′ 6= l′1 6= ... 6= l′D−1 s.t. m˜′j′ −m′j′ = m′k′ − m˜′k′ = 1, m˜′l′v = m′l′v
for v = {1, ..., D − 1}. What this simply means is that after changing one record, the discrete counts in
the nodes change by at most one in two of the nodes and does not change in the other D − 1 nodes.
Due to the fact that the CART model produces the D splits that minimize the impurity, we know
both that
ΣD+1i=1 a
′
i
(
1− a
′
i
m′i
)
≤ ΣD+1i=1 ai
(
1− ai
m˜i
)
(14)
and
ΣD+1i=1 ai
(
1− ai
mi
)
≤ ΣD+1i=1 a′i
(
1− a
′
i
m˜′i
)
. (15)
The inequality 14 implies that after changing one record, if new split points are chosen, the impurity must
be equivalent or better than simply keeping the previous splits and changing the counts. The inequality
15 implies that the first split points chosen must be equivalent or better than using the new splits with
the changed counts. If this were not the case, the first split points would have never been made in the
first place. These lead to the final step.
Because we have an absolute value, we consider two cases.
Case 1: GI(X,Xs, D) ≥ GI(X ′, Xs, D)
sup
D
∣∣∣∣∣ΣD+1i=1 ai(1− aimi
)
−ΣD+1i=1 a′i
(
1− a
′
i
m′i
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
sup
D
∣∣∣∣∣ΣD+1i=1 a′i(1− a′im˜′i
)
−ΣD+1i=1 a′i
(
1− a
′
i
m′i
)∣∣∣∣∣ =∣∣∣∣∣a′j′(1− a′j′m˜′j′
)
− a′j′
(
1− a
′
j′
m′j′
)
+ a′k′
(
1− a
′
k′
m˜′k′
)
− a′k′
(
1− a
′
k′
m′k′
)∣∣∣∣∣ =∣∣∣∣∣a′2j′(m˜′j′ −m′j′)m˜′j′m′j′ + a
′2
k′(m˜
′
k′ −m′k′)
m˜′k′m
′
k′
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ a′2j′m˜′j′m′j′ − a
′2
k′
m˜′k′m
′
k′
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2 (16)
The last step we know because ai ≤ mi, and n2n(n−1) ≤ 2.
Case 2: GI(X ′, Xs, D) ≥ GI(X,Xs, D)
sup
D
∣∣∣∣∣ΣD+1i=1 ai(1− aimi
)
−ΣD+1i=1 a′i
(
1− a
′
i
m′i
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
sup
D
∣∣∣∣∣ΣD+1i=1 ai(1− aim˜i
)
−ΣD+1i=1 ai
(
1− ai
mi
)∣∣∣∣∣ =∣∣∣∣∣aj(1− ajm˜j
)
− aj
(
1− aj
mj
)
+ ak
(
1− ak
m˜k
)
− ak
(
1− ak
mk
)∣∣∣∣∣ =∣∣∣∣∣a′2j (m˜j −mj)m˜jmj + a
′2
k (m˜k −mk)
m˜kmk
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ a′2jm˜jmj − a
′2
k
m˜kmk
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2 (17)
Finally, this gives us ∆GI ≤ 2 =⇒ ∆GI2n = ∆u ≤ 1n .
10 Appendix: Full Simulation Results
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